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COMPARING TWO RECESSIONS IN IRELAND: GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS VS COVID-19
 
* Matthew Allen-Coghlan and Petros Varthalitis1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The rate at which the COVID-19 pandemic has spread across the globe and the 
damage it has caused to so many countries is unprecedented in modern times. Not 
since the spread of the Spanish Flu over 100 years ago has there been a global 
health crisis of this scale and severity. The economic impact of COVID-19 is also 
global and already the pandemic has had a significant adverse impact on the world 
economy. However, we do not have to go back a century to find a global economic 
shock of this scale. The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was just over ten years ago and 
like the current economic crisis it spread throughout the world impacting advanced 
and developing economies alike.  
 
The Irish economy was no exception and much has been written on the devasting 
impact of the resulting recession.2 Given the severity of that recession and how 
recently it occurred, a natural question arises around the similarities and 
differences between the GFC and the one currently being experienced as a result 
of the pandemic.  
 
Recently, other commentators have also compared the economic impact of the 
COVID-19 crisis with past major global crises. For example, De Grawe and Ji (2020) 
compare the COVID-19 crisis, the GFC and the 1933 Great Depression using 
indicators of the world economy. Buti (2020) compares the GFC with COVID-19 
crisis for the EU economy and Wheelock (2020) compares the COVID-19 crisis with 
the Great Depression focusing on the US economy.  
 
In this Research Note we explore how both crises impacted various aspects of the 
Irish economy. In order to do that we analyse key economic indicators across both 
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caused by each crisis. We focus on three types of indicators: hard indicators, which 
can be thought of as a measure of realised outcomes, soft indicators which can be 
thought of as a measure of expectations and policy responses, both at a national 
and EU level. 
 
The rest of this Note is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the 
nature of the two shocks and the differences in the economy entering into both 
periods. Section 3 compares various hard indicators across both periods while 
Section 4 compares soft indicators. Section 5 discusses the different policy 
response to both crises, both at a national and EU level. Section 6 concludes.  
2. NATURE OF THE SHOCKS 
Before examining the impact that both crises have had on the Irish economy, we 
first outline the nature of the two shocks and the differences in how they 
manifested themselves in the economy. 
 
The initial trigger for the GFC started with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the 
United States in 2008. Due to the interconnectedness of the global financial 
system, credit dried up globally and the lack of liquidity transmitted to European 
financial markets. The problem intensified in several Eurozone countries with the 
sovereign debt crisis. 
 
While this initial trigger originated outside the Irish economy, it was endogenous 
structural distortions within the economy that magnified the shock through the 
Irish system. These distortions were in the form of the property market and credit 
bubbles that had emerged in the Irish economy over the prior decade. Banks and 
households were overleveraged in this regard and the Irish government had 
become increasingly reliant on revenues from the property sector. Thus, when 
these twin bubbles burst banks became insolvent, households fell into negative 
equity and the public finances collapsed. 
 
The COVID-19 crisis on the other hand is the definition of an exogenous shock.3 
This unpredictable health crisis emerged from outside the economic system and 
thus far has not been propagated by structural distortions in the economy in the 
same way the GFC was. One of the ways this is evidenced is by comparing the 









Figure 1 shows the household debt in the country since 2003. Going into the 
previous recession the level of household debt had been increasing sharply and by 
Q1 2008 it was up over €200 billion. By comparison, in Q1 2020 the level of 
household debt was just over €130 billion following a decade in which household 
debt has been falling steadily. The difference between both periods is even more 
stark when taken relative to disposable income. In Q1 2008 household debt to 
disposable income was up over 200 per cent in comparison to just over 100 per 
cent in Q1 2020.  
 
FIGURE 1 HOUSEHOLD DEBT  
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland.  
 
Another metric of the amount of leverage in the system is the credit gap. The credit 
gap is a measure of the difference between the actual and long-run trend level of 
the credit-to-GDP ratio.4 When the gap is positive, the current level of the ratio is 
greater than trend and when the gap is negative the current level of the ratio is 
less than trend. If the gap becomes significantly large, this may suggest that the 
level of credit in the economy is unsustainable. Going into the GFC the credit gap 
had peaked at just under 70 per cent. However, since then there has been a steady 





















pandemic crisis the credit gap remained around 0 per cent indicating that the 
amount of credit in the economy was not at an unsustainable level.  
 
FIGURE 2 CREDIT GAP (%) 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland.  
 
Both measures show that there was significantly less leverage in the system going 
into the COVID-19 crisis in comparison to the GFC. One of the reasons for this is 
likely a result of the introduction of a number of regulatory measures which were 
put in place post the GFC recession. These include the macroprudential rules and 
the counter-cyclical capital buffer which have been designed to reduce the amount 
of credit in the Irish economy.5 
3. HARD INDICATORS 
3.1 Quarterly indicators 
When the pandemic first took effect there was an expectation amongst most policy 
institutions and forecasters that there would be a decline in Ireland’s output in 
2020 greater than anything the country had experienced before.6 The largest 
decline in output was expected to come in Q2, the period over which the strictest 




5  For further discussion on the impact of these financial stability measures see: Lozej and O’Brien (2018) and Economides 
et al. (2019). 








































































































































in Figure 3 reveal that while the decline in output in Q2 was significant it was not 
unprecedented. In Q2 2020 real GDP growth fell by just under 4 per cent compared 
to the same quarter the previous year. During the previous recession we saw much 
greater declines in GDP over multiple quarters. In every quarter between 2008 and 
2009 there was a decline in annual GDP growth and over four of these quarters the 
negative GDP growth was greater than that experienced in Q2 2020. The largest 
decline came in Q4 2008 when real GDP fell by over 10 per cent compared to the 
same period the previous year.  
 
FIGURE 3 REAL GDP GROWTH (YEAR-ON-YEAR)  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
  
Figure 4 also shows output growth for the Irish economy except here the economy 
is divided into the tradable and non-tradable sectors.7 The impact of the pandemic 
crisis on the domestic sector is indeed unprecedented, with the decline in output 
in the non-tradable sector much greater than anything that was seen during the 
previous recession. The largest decline in real GVA in the non-tradable sector 
during the previous recession was in Q1 2009 when output declined by over 10 per 
cent compared to the same period the previous year. The annual decline in Q2 
2020 was nearly double that, with a negative growth rate of just over 19 per cent. 




7  The tradable and non-tradable GVA are defined as in Bergin et al. (2017). A sector is defined as tradable if at least 
50 per cent of total final uses (excluding change in stocks) is exported. The tradable sectors (NACE classification): 
Industry (excl. Construction), Information and Communication, Financial and Insurance Activities, Professional, Admin 
and Support Services. Non-tradable sectors (NACE classification): Agriculture, Forestry and fishing, Construction, 
Distribution, Transport, Hotels and Restaurants, Real estate activities, Public admin, Education and Health, Arts, 












much more benign than anything experienced during the GFC recession. In 
Q2 2020 the tradable sector actually experienced positive output growth, up over 
2 per cent compared to the same period the previous year. This compares to 
sizeable declines in output growth in the tradable sector during the previous 
recession. The dichotomy between the performance of the tradable and non-
tradable sectors is an example of how the current pandemic crisis is having very 
different impacts on different sectors of the economy. The fact that the overall 
decline in output in Q2 was relatively benign despite such an unprecedented 
decline in the non-tradable sector also highlights how important the tradable 
sector is to the fortunes of the Irish economy. Within the tradable sector, it was 
the strong performance of just a small number of sectors, namely pharmaceutical 
and computer services that accounted for the positive growth over this period.8 
 
FIGURE 4 REAL GVA GROWTH, TRADABLE AND NON-TRADABLE SECTORS (YEAR-ON-
YEAR) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
3.1.2 Monthly indicators 
The following hard indicators have a monthly time frequency which has the 
advantage of giving us more up-to-date data points for the current pandemic which 
would not be available with quarterly data. Monthly data also allow us to see how 
the economic indicators react to sudden shifts in policy and sentiment which is 
especially important given the rapidly changing nature of the current health crisis. 

















pandemic recession and the GFC we overlay the monthly data from both periods. 
In order to do this we first choose a turning point which marks the month prior to 
which the recession began in both periods. Choosing the month in which the 
recession began for the pandemic crisis is quite straightforward as the first 
lockdown restrictions were put in place in March 2020. Therefore, February 2020 
is identified as the turning point for the pandemic crisis. Identifying the turning 
point for the GFC is not as straightforward as there is a not a single month we can 
identify as to when the recession started over this period. We therefore base this 
turning point on retail sales. Retail sales are sensitive to both underlying economic 
conditions and economic sentiment and so this a reasonable economic indicator 
on which to base the turning point.9 Based on the retail sales data we identify 
January 2008 as the turning point i.e. the month before we see a large decrease in 
retail sales volume over consecutive months. Overlaying the two periods based on 
these turning points we then compare the scale and rapidity of the shocks to these 
indicators across both periods. 
 
Figure 5 shows that after the initial lockdown restrictions were brought in in March 
retail sales collapsed. At this time, the country was in strictest phase of the 
lockdown when many retailers were forced to close their doors. By April, the total 
volume of retail sales was down nearly 50 per cent compared to the period 
immediately preceding the lockdown. However, the recovery in retail sales has 
been equally sharp with the volume of sales increasing above pre-lockdown levels 
just four months after the initial turning point. In contrast during the GFC the 
decline in retail sales was much more gradual. Over the 12 months after the GFC 
turning point, retail sales declined by around 20 per cent and remained at this 
lower level over the next three years. The V-shaped recovery of retail sales is likely 
a result of pent-up demand following the months in which consumers were unable 
to access retail stores as well as improved expectations for the future economic 









FIGURE 5 RETAIL SALES, VOLUME ADJUSTED (INDEX, T0=100) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Figure 6 shows the unemployment rate over the two recessions. During the GFC 
there was a gradual increase in the unemployment rate which continued to rise 
over a four-year period after the initial turning point, eventually peaking at just 
over 16 per cent. In contrast during the current recession the increase in the 
unemployment rate has been much sharper, peaking at over 30 per cent just two 
months after the turning point.10 In the subsequent months, as the lockdown 
restrictions were eased, there was also a sharp recovery in the unemployment rate. 
However, the momentum of this recovery began to slow in Q3 and there has been 
a spike in the unemployment rate in the most recent data as a result of the Level 5 
lockdown, though not as steep as that seen during the first lockdown. One of the 
main differences between the two periods in how Ireland deals with the shock to 
the labour market is the migration channel. Historically, outward migration has 
acted as a release valve for pressure in the Irish labour market with large levels of 
emigration synonymous with recessions in the country. For this reason, the 
unemployment rate during previous recessions such as the GFC was likely subdued 
by the thousands of Irish people who sought work outside the country. Given the 
current restrictions around international travel and the significant economic 
contraction being experienced by most of the world’s major economies, the ability 




10  The unemployment rate referenced since March 2020 is what the CSO refers to as the upper-bound. This counts all 
those on the Pandemic Unemployment Programme as being unemployed. The unemployment rate according to the 
































































emigration would not act as a panacea to the pandemic unemployment crisis given 
the large estimates of people unemployed, the inability of people to emigrate for 
work is likely contributing to the elevated unemployment rate. 
 
FIGURE 6 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
Note:  The unemployment rate includes those on the Pandemic Unemployment Payment which is the upper bound of the CSO’s 
unemployment data. 
 
At the onset of COVID-19 it was uncertain what impact the pandemic would have 
on inflation due to the shock to both the supply and demand side of the economy. 
On the supply side many businesses have been forced to close and workers in some 
industries have been prevented from going to their jobs. Globally, supply chains 
have been significantly disrupted and international trade has been disturbed. On 
the demand side there have been significant declines in consumption and large 
increases in savings.11 While both these effects should pull inflation in opposite 
directions, the initial data we have after the turning point shows that the country 
has entered a period of deflation, indicating that the pandemic might have a 
greater impact on the demand side of the economy. The inflation rate has gone 
from just over 1 per cent before the initial lockdown to about -1.5 per cent in 
September. Though the decline in energy prices has contributed to this deflation, 
core inflation which excludes energy prices and unprocessed foods is also negative 
(-0.6 per cent in September). Going into the previous recession the inflation rate 

































































the country was experiencing at that time. However, as the recession took effect 
there was large negative impact on prices which started to decline ten months 
after the turning point. The CPI continued to decline for another year with prices 
bottoming out at negative 6 per cent about 22 months after the initial turning 
point. It wasn’t for another 12 months that price growth turned positive, showing 
that deflation in the economy can be quite persistent. 
 
FIGURE 7 CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (YEAR-ON-YEAR) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
4. SOFT INDICATORS 
In order to compare how expectations have differed over the two recessions we 
also draw on a number of soft indicators, the first of which is consumer confidence. 
In the first few months after the turning point of the COVID-19 pandemic there was 
a sharp decline in consumer confidence. By May 2020 consumer confidence had 
bottomed out at just over 97 index points. However, in recent months there has 
been some evidence of increased consumer optimism with the index rising in four 
consecutive months since May. 
 
During the previous recession consumer confidence remained below its 
pre-turning point level for a number of years. The oscillating path of the Consumer 





























































FIGURE 8 CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDEX (T0=100) 
 
 
Source:  OECD.  
 
Figure 9 shows the composite Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) for the 
manufacturing and services sectors. The PMI is based on a monthly survey of senior 
executives at private market companies and gives an indication of underlying 
business conditions and sentiment. A value over 50 indicates that there is an 
expansion on the previous month while a value below 50 indicates there is a 
contraction. Like the Consumer Sentiment Index, there was an initial sharp decline 
in the PMI as the lockdown was brought in in March. The PMI fell below 20 in April 
which was a record low for the Index. Though the Index briefly rose above 50 in 
subsequent months, this is a month-on-month indicator and so the increase is 
relative to the very low point reached in April. Indeed, the most recent data are 
again below 50 indicating a contraction on previous months. During the GFC the 
PMI declined below 50 immediately after the turning point and remained below 
50 for over two years thereafter, meaning that for 24 straight months, private 
market companies viewed underlying business conditions as being less favourable 





























































FIGURE 9 PURCHASING MANAGERS INDEX  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
The final indicator compared between the two periods is the ISEQ Index which is 
benchmark stock index of the 20 largest companies that trade on the Irish stock 
market. This index captures investor sentiment about the future prospects of these 
Irish companies and thus is an indicator of the market’s expectations about future 
economic conditions. As with the other soft indicators there was an initial sharp 
decline in the index after the turning point March. However, unlike the other soft 
indicators the recovery has been rapid and the most recent data show that the 
index is at a greater value than it was entering into the lockdown. The relatively 
robust performance of the stock market may indicate that investors are optimistic 
about the future business conditions and that once the virus is brought under 
control there is an expectation that the economy will be able to pick back up where 
it left off. This is a stark contrast to the previous recession when stock prices 
plummeted by 70 per cent from their pre-lockdown levels and remained low for a 





























































FIGURE 10 ISEQ (INDEX, T0=100) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
5. POLICY RESPONSE 
The final comparison we draw between the two periods is in the area of the policy 
response. There has been a significant difference in how policymakers at both a 
national and European level have responded to both crises.  
 
As the lockdown restrictions were brought in in March 2020, the Irish Government 
immediately launched a large fiscal stimulus package to mitigate the negative 
economic effect of the pandemic. Equally important has been the response of the 
ECB which, through its accommodative monetary policy, has facilitated the 
national fiscal expansion.  
 
The combined national (fiscal) and ECB (monetary) policy responses during the 
COVID-19 pandemic are in sharp contrast with the associated responses during the 
GFC. At the time of the GFC, national fiscal policy was much more restrictive due 
to the multiannual fiscal consolidation programme implemented mostly via 
spending cuts. The ECB was also implementing tighter monetary policy during the 
initial phase of the GFC, partly a result of the asymmetric impact of the GFC on 
different Eurozone countries. 
5.1 National fiscal policy 
Regarding national fiscal expenditures, Table 1 shows the annual growth in 




























































Across nearly all headings a significant increase in expenditure is forecast for 2020 
in comparison to the previous year. In percentage terms the largest increase is in 
the area of subsidies which are forecast to increase by 266 per cent (€4.5 billion) 
this year as a result of the implementation of various wage subsidy schemes and 
subsidies to firms impacted by the lockdowns. Social benefit payments are forecast 
to increase by about 28 per cent (€8.6 billion) as a result of the large increase in 
people receiving welfare payments including the Pandemic Unemployment 
Payment (PUP). The use of goods and services is also expected to increase 
substantially resulting from increased health-related expenditure. In total Irish 
government expenditure is expected to increase by 23 per cent (€19.0 billion) in 
2020. Interest payments are the only expenditure heading that are forecast to 
experience a reduction in 2020 with respect to 2019, due to the fall in the cost of 
borrowing. In 2008/2009 interest payments increased partly due to the increased 
cost of borrowing over this period (see Section 5.2 for more). 
 
TABLE 1 EXPENDITURE GROWTH BY HEADING (YEAR-ON-YEAR) 





Compensation of employees 7 -2 3 
Use of goods and services 3 -1 40 
Subsidies 7 -2 266 
Interest 21 42 -14 
Social benefits 13 10 28 
Total 10 7 23 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and Budget 2021. 
Note: 2020 figures on forecasts from Budget 2021. 
 
In terms of revenues, so far during the COVID-19 recession total tax receipts have 
experienced a relatively mild decrease compared to the sharp fall that was 
experienced over the years of the GFC. Figure 11 illustrates that this difference is 
mostly driven by two tax headings; corporation and income taxes. 
 
The most significant difference between the pandemic crisis and the GFC is in 
corporation taxes. Despite the deterioration in economic activity, corporation 
taxes have increased by over 11 per cent in 2020. By comparison corporation taxes 
fell by 23 and 26 per cent in 2008 and 2009, respectively. After years of significant 
growth,12 corporation taxes also account for a larger share of total tax receipts than 
they did during the GFC. Their strong performance this year is the main reason why 
total receipts have held up reasonably well, declining by just 5 per cent compared 








relatively muted in 2020 despite the large increase in unemployment. This is a 
result of those who have lost their jobs typically being in lower paid sectors, 
Ireland’s progressive taxation system and the various wage subsidy schemes that 
have kept workers on their employers’ payroll. The declines in VAT receipts are 
much more in line with what we saw during the previous recession, down by 19 per 
cent in 2020 compared to 8 per cent and 23 per cent in 2008 and 2009.13  
 
FIGURE 11 TAX RECEIPTS GROWTH BY HEADING (YEAR-ON-YEAR) 
 
 
Source:  Fiscal Monitor. 
5.2  Eurozone and EU policy 
One of the most striking differences between COVID-19 and GFC is the policy 
response of EU institutions. 
 
During the period of the GFC the Irish government was solely reliant on the 
international and domestic private markets to borrow and finance its national 
deficits. As the public finances deteriorated at this time the demand for Irish 
government debt from the private markets declined substantially while sovereign 
spreads rose significantly, rendering public debt unsustainable. 
 
Since 2011 as the European Sovereign Debt Crisis took hold the ECB gradually 
began to directly intervene in the sovereign bond markets of Member States. 
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increased the amount of Irish sovereign debt held by the Eurosystem (see 
Figure 12).  
 
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic the ECB has engaged in further sovereign 
bond purchases through the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP).  
 
FIGURE 12 IRISH LONG-TERM DEBT HELD BY THE PRIVATE MARKET/EUROSYSTEM 
 
Source:  National Treasury Management Agency.  
 
The accommodative monetary policy implemented by the ECB has driven 
sovereign bond yields across the Eurozone to record lows. These low yields mean 
that the effective interest rates on Irish debt have lowered despite the increasing 
deficits. These lower borrowing costs have created additional fiscal space for the 
Irish Government to fund the large deficits that will be run in 2020 and 2021.14 On 
the other hand, in the early phase of the GFC, the ECB’s monetary policy was much 
more conservative and the yields on Irish government debt were substantially 
higher, peaking at over 10 per cent as private markets shunned Irish debt. It was 
only through signals from the ECB that it would do ‘Whatever it takes’ to save the 
euro including the aforementioned direct intervention in the bond markets and the 
Irish public finances being brought back under control that interest payments on 









































































































































FIGURE 13 IRISH TEN-YEAR GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS 
Global Financial Crisis     COVID-19 crisis 
  
 
Source:  Investing.com. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This Note has compared the evolution of key indicators of the Irish economy during 
the current COVID-19 pandemic crisis and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.  
 
The scale of the negative shock for most key indicators is much more severe during 
the COVID-19 crisis. However, thus far it seems that the economy bounces back 
much more rapidly than during the GFC where the downward movement was 
gradual and more prolonged.  
 
One of the key differences between this time and then is the relative uniformity in 
how all European countries have been impacted by the virus. During the previous 
crisis the impact on Ireland and other Eurozone periphery countries was much 
different to other core Eurozone countries.  
 
Partly resulting from this, the policy response at a European level has been 
fundamentally different during the two crises. National fiscal and Eurozone 
monetary policies (ECB) have coordinated in a timely manner to support the Irish 
and other Eurozone economies. The large spending programmes run by European 
countries in an attempt to mitigate the economic fallout have in turn been 
supported by the monetary policy that keeps sovereign spreads at low levels. Thus, 
the monetary-fiscal policy nexus is in contrast to the policies implemented during 
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